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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CECIL R. MARTIN, 
Plain'tiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CARL EHLERS, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 
9565 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from the verdict and judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Honorable A. H. 
Ellett, Judge. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover for personal injuries and prop-
erty damage arising out of an intersection collision between the 
plaintiff driving his automobile and the defendant driving an 
emergency police vehicle. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and judgment 
for the plaintiff, defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the verdict and for judgment 
in his favor as a matter of law, or in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The collision occurred in the intersection where 7th East 
Street intersects 27th South Street in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
7th East Street is 3 7 feet, 11 inches wide. The west side of the 
street is 19 feet wide with one traffic lane; the east side of 
the street has two trafficlanes separated by a solid line. 27th 
South Street is 39 feet, 11 inches wide on the west side of the 
intersection and 41 feet, 1 inch wide on the east side. There 
are two lanes for eastbound traffic. (Tr. 5, 6 and 7, Exhibits 
P1, P2 and P3). 
The point of impact was located 24 feet, 7 inches south of 
the north curb line of 27th South Street and 13 feet, 4 inches 
north of the south curb line of this street, and 17 feet, 10 inches 
east of the west curb line of 7th East Street. (Tr. 9 and Exhibit 
Pl). 
The intersection was paved with asphalt (Tr. 5) and was 
level (Tr. 10). The sun was shining and the roads were dry 
(Tr. 10, 76 and 98). The collision occurred about 5:30p.m. in 
heavy traffic. (Tr. 12 and 13). 
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The appellant is a deputy sheriff for Salt Lake County. 
(Tr. 94). On June 10, 1959, at about 5:30p.m. he was respond-
ing to an emergency call in a police automobile. (Tr. 96). It 
was equipped with a siren and two spotlights. The siren was 
located under the hood in the front of the automobile and the 
red spotlight was located at the bottom of the windshield on 
the right side of the car. The white spotlight was located in 
the same position on the left side of the car. (Tr. 97 and 98). 
Both lights were burning and the siren was constantly sounding 
from the time the officer began the emergency journey until the 
impact occurred. (Tr. 97, 98, 103 and 104). The posted speed 
limit on both streets was 30 miles per hour. (Tr. 31). As he 
approached within one block of the intersection where the 
accident occurred, he was driving south on 7th East Street 
between 35 and 40 miles per hour. (Tr. 98 and 99). There were 
automobiles stopped at the north, south and east entrances 
to the intersection. (Tr. 71, 99, 109 and 110). It was necessary 
to drive on the east side of 7th East Street because of the 
traffic stopped on the west side of the street at the intersection. 
(Tr. 77). As the police car neared the intersection, it was free 
of traffic. (Tr. 79). The officer slowed for the intersection 
and shifted into a lower gear. ( T r. 82, 90, 101 and 111) . When 
the vehicle entered the intersection, it was struck broadside by 
respondent's car traveling in an easterly direction on 27th 
South Street, at about 30 miles per hour. (Tr. 48). The sema-
phore for east-west traffic had turned green as respondent 
was from 30 to 50 feet from the intersection. (Tr. 48). Respon-
dent testified that he did not hear the siren nor observe the 
police car at any time prior to its entering the intersection. 
(Tr. 50). His automobile skidded 24 feet, 9 inches before the 
impact. (Tr. 9 and 10). 
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Two witnesses revealed themselves to the investigating 
officers. One of them, J. Thomas Fyans, was stopped north 
of the intersection. His car was the first in line at the intersec-
tion facing south. (Tr. 78). He heard the siren and saw the 
emergency vehicle when it was 500 to 600 feet north of the 
intersection. (Tr. 77). The siren sounded continuously until 
the impact. (Tr. 81). Fyans stayed in position while the police 
vehicle approached, even though the light turned green for 
Fyan's direction of travel. (Tr. 78, 79, 80 and 91). 
The other witness, Daniel R. Gehrke, was directly behind 
the Fyans automobile and he also heard the siren and saw the 
red light burning on the vehicle. (Tr. 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43). 
The impact knocked the emergency vehicle in a south-
easterly direction where it spun around and struck a vehicle 
stopped in the northbound lane of traffic on 7th East. It then 
slid up against a utility pole on the southeast corner of the 
intersection. The respondent's automobile moved approximately 
10 feet after the impact and came to rest facing in a south-
easterly direction near the center of the northbound lane of 
traffic. (Tr. 17 and 18, Exhibit Pl) ~ 
As respondent approached the intersection, he noticed 
cars stopped at the north, south and east entrances to the 
intersection and also that there was no moving traffic in the 
intersection. (Tr. 71). He was moving about 30 miles per 
hour at the time of impact and hadn't slowed down for the 
intersection. (Tr. 29, 68, 70 and 72). Both cars were damaged 
beyond repair and respondent received a minor chest injury. 
(Tr. 83, 101, 102 and Exhibits P4 and P5). 
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POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL 
I. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FIND-
ING THAT APPELLANT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
II. RESPONDENT WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FIND-
ING THAT APPELLANT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
The appellant, hereinafter referred to as the officer, was 
responding to an emergency call and was therefore not subject 
to the usual rules and regulations governing the use of the 
highway by motorists. Title 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. He also had the right of way. Title 41-6-76, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
An independent witness stated that the police car had 
its siren sounding and red light operating at least five to six 
hundred feet before the impact occurred. (Tr. 76 and 77). 
The siren and red light were continuously operating up to the 
point of impact. (Tr. 80 and 81). It should also be noted that 
the emergency vehicle was reducing speed as it approached the 
intersection. (Tr. 82). The evidence showed conclusively that 
with the exception of respondent's automobile, all other traffic 
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had stopped at the entrance to the intersection awaiting the 
emergency vehicle. (Tr. 78 and 79). Since the officer was 
conforming to the statutory requirements of notice to be given 
by an emergency vehicle, coupled with the fact that all auto-
mobiles within his view had stopped to yield the right of way 
to him, he had a right to proceed upon the assumption that 
the other automobiles on the highway would yield the right 
of way to him. See Lakoduk vs. Cruger, (Wash.) 296 Pac. 
2d 690, more fully hereinafter discussed. 
The evidence further shows that when the respondent's 
automobile came into view of the officer, there remained less 
than 25 feet in which to bring the emergency vehicle to a stop. 
(Tr. 9). Even at a speed of less than 20 miles per hour, the 
officer could not have stopped in time to have avoided the 
accident. His vehicle was struck broadside from the right. (Tr. 
100 and Exhibit P4). 
It is respectfully noted at this point that the jury found 
that the officer had his car under proper control. (R. 54). 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that by virtue of the 
facts as indicated above, there was no substantial evidence 
upon which a jury could base a finding of negligence in the 
way the officer was operating the emergency vehicle. The only 
finding by the jury that the officer was negligent, which negli-
gence proximately caused the accident, was that he was driving 
too fast for the conditions then and there existing. (R. 54). 
A well reasoned opinion from the Supreme Court of the 
State of Washington involving facts very similar to those. in 
the instant case, with a statute substantially the same as our 
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Utah statute, is set forth in the aforementioned case of Lakoduk 
vs. Cruger, 296 Pac. 2d 690. In this case, a fire truck proceeded 
through an intersection against a red light while sounding 
its siren and displaying a red light in response to a fire alarm. 
The plaintiffs entered the intersection from a right angle to 
the fire truck and their pickup truck was struck broadside by the 
fire truck, killing three occupants of the pickup truck. With 
the exception of the fact that in the instant case the respondent 
collided with the emergency vehicle, the facts in the two cases 
appear to be the same. In reviewing the Washington Motor 
Vehicle Act, which is virtually the same as the Utah Motor 
Act involved herein, the Court, at page 701, quoted from the 
decision of Lucas vs. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 475, 75 
Pac. 2d 602, as follows: 
"The expression 'with due regard for the safety of 
all persons using the highway' was explained in the 
Balthasar case where the Court said: 'It is evident 
that the right of way of fire apparatus over other 
vehicles is dependent upon due regard to the safety of 
the public only insofar as such due regard affects the 
persons required to yield the right of way. Notice to 
the person required to yield the right of way is essential, 
and a reasonable opportunity to stop or otherwise 
yield the right of way necessary in order to charge a 
person with the obligation fixed by law to give prece-
dence to the fire apparatus. This is the only reasonable 
interpretation that the statute will bear. If the driver· 
of an emergency vehicle is at all times required to 
drive with due regard for the safety of the public as 
all other drivers are required to do, then all the pro-
visions of these statutes relating to emergency vehicles 
become meaningless and no privileges are granted to 
them. But if his 'due regard' for the safety of others 
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means that he should, by suitable warning, give others 
a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of way, the 
statutes become workable for the purposes intended.' " 
See also the case of State of Washington vs. United States, 
9th Circuit, 194 Fed. 2d 38. 
The Washington Court then went on to say, in substance, 
that an arbitrary exercise of the privileges granted to an emer-
gency vehicle cannot be predicated upon the elements of speed, 
and failure to observe other vehicles on the road, where a 
warning has been given. The Court stated at page 703: 
"In the case at bar, there is no conflict in the evi-
dence relative to the use of the red lights and the 
continuous sounding of the siren with which the hose 
wagon was equipped. Fourteen disinterested witnesses 
heard the siren when at various points in the vicinity 
of the intersection, some of them at a greater distance 
from the approaching fire apparatus than was the farm 
truck. The conclusion seems irresistable that Mr. 
Lakoduk either did hear the siren but failed to heed 
the warning, or, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
should have heard it." 
See also Holser vs. City of Midland, 3 30 Mich. 581, 48 
N.W. 2d 208. 
It should be noted in our instant case that all automobiles 
at the intersection either heard or observed the emergency 
vehicle approaching and yielded the right of way, as required 
by law, with the exception of the respondent. The facts show, 
without contradiction, that the officer had every right to expect 
that other users of the highway in front of him would yield 
the right of way, as every automobile in view had stopped. The 
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respondent failed to produce any evidence to show that had the 
officer been driving in any other manner he could have avoided 
the accident when respondent's automobile came into view. 
Under the conditions as they then existed, it would be highly 
unreasonable to expect the operator of an emergency vehicle 
to bring his automobile to a stop in a distance of less than 
25 feet. Under such a state of facts, the conclusion is irresistible 
that the officer was not negligent, nor did he in any way proxi-
mately cause or contribute to the happening of the accident. 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The evidence shows without contradiction that two in-
dependent witnesses saw and heard the emergency vehicle ap-
proaching the intersection. It is also clear that the drivers of all 
the other vehicles in the vicinity of the intersection, whose 
names were never disclosed, were also aware of the approach 
of an emergency vehicle and yielded accordingly. 
Witness Fyans stated that he heard and saw the emergency 
vehicle approaching the intersection when it was at least 500 to 
600 feet to the North of the intersection. (Tr. 77 and 78). 
Witness Gehrke also heard and saw the officer approaching. 
The respondent maintains that he neither saw nor heard the 
emergency vehicle approaching as he neared the intersection, 
although all other cars at or near the intersection had stopped 
and yielded the right of way to the officer. This problem was 
also considered in the Lakoduk case, supra, at page 703, where-
in the Court said: 
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"The deceased driver of the farm truck . . . was 
required upon hearing the siren, to yield the right of 
way by driving to the right curb, stopping, and remain-
ing-there until the emergency vehicle had passed when 
( 1) the authorized emergency vehicle was approaching 
and ( 2) was giving audible signal by siren. This 
statute is unambiguous. Since appellants had red lights 
on their vehicle flashing and _were giving the required 
audible signal, the deceased driver will be deemed to 
have seen and heard that which was there to be seen 
and heard by a reasonably prudent driver, exercising 
due care for his own safety. Under the provisions of 
this statute it became the mandatory duty of the de-
ceased driver to yield the right of way. He failed to 
obey the mandate of the statute. It must therefore be 
held, as a matter of law_, that his failure to do so was 
negligen·ce, which was a proximate cause of the acci-
-dent." (Italics ours). 
It is respectfully submitted that after the officer in. our 
present case gave the required signals, the respondent was 
required to. yield the right of way to him. The officer had a 
right to rely upon the signals given and the right of way 
granted him by statute until such time as he knew, or in the ex-
ercise of reasonable care should have known, that the respondent 
was not going to yield the right of way. _This could only have 
occurred at the time the respondent's vehicle entered the inter-
section. The evidence reveals that less than 2 5 feet was traveled 
by the emergency vehicle before being struck broadside by 
respondent's automobile. With such short notice of impending 
danger, it was impossible for the officer to stop. As also was 
stated by the Washington Court in the Lakoduk case: 
"Appellants did not see that the farm truck was not 
going to accord the hose wagon the right of way until 
10 
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the farm truck actually entered the intersection and 
was about 25 feet directly in front of the hose wagon. 
It affirmatively appears by undisputed evidence that 
at that moment there was not appreciable time for 
appellants to avert the certain disaster which inevitably 
followed." Lakoduk vs. Cruger, supra, at page 703. 
Accordingly, in our instant factual situation, the officer 
could not have been the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
Respondent must have been at least contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law. Both drivers had an equal opportunity 
to see and avoid each other but were unable to do so. If the 
officer was negligent in failing to avoid the collision, because 
of the proximity of the respondent, then so must the respondent 
have been negligent. The officer had a statutory right of way 
and a right to assume that the respondent would heed his 
warnings in compliance with the requirements of the statute. 
If, after colliding with an emergency vehicle the operator 
of the disfavored vehicle is permitted to escape his responsibility 
under the statute, requiring him to yield, by merely saying that 
he did not see or hear the emergency vehicle, even though all 
other operators in the immediate vicinity did see or hear the 
emergency vehicle, the statute then becomes meaningless. If 
respondent is to be judged in the light of a reasonable prudent 
person under the circumstances, he must then be charged with 
either having seen or heard the emergency vehicle approach 
as did all other drivers in the immediate vicinity. His failure 
to then yield would be negligence and at least a substantial 
and contributing factor in causing the accident. If the operators 
of emergency vehicles cannot place reasonable reliance upon 
the statute granting them the right of way, then the only safe 
11 
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course of conduct for them is to obey all traffic rules and 
regulations while proceeding on an emergency call. This will 
effectively convert a speedy errand of mercy into a casual ride at 
the expense of person in imminent peril. Public policy requires 
speedy assistance be given to those whose lives are in peril and 
this of course is the reason for the statutes applicable thereto. 
Emergency vehicle operators are required by the due per-
formance of their duty to expose themselves to unusual risks 
of injury by answering emergency calls. If, in return, they 
are not granted a strong measure of protection in the perform-
ance of their duties, the obvious result will be an emergency 
journey without haste and at the expense of the public. This 
is not what the legislature contemplated in passing statutes 
for the benfit of such emergency vehicle drivers. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
The trial court, by its Instruction No. 16, instructed the 
jurors that both respondent and appellant were to be judged 
by the same standard of care. (R. 48) . This line of reasoning 
also was included in the Special Verdict. (R. 54). Appellant's 
counsel duly excepted to the same. (Tr. 120). Even in those 
jurisdictions where the courts submit issues of speed to the jury 
as a question of fact in determining whether the driver of an 
emergency vehicle is exercising due regard for the safety of 
others, the standard of care to be exercised by the operator of 
the emergency vehicle is not judged by the same standard as 
12 
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an ordinary motor vehicle operator. See McKay vs. Hargis, 
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1958, 351 Mich. 409, 88 N.W. 
2d 456, wherein that Court stated that the test is, did the 
officer exercise 
"the care which a reasonably prudent man would 
exercise in the discharge of official duties of like 
nature under like circumstances." 
Appellant respectfully submits that the standard of care 
exercised by an operator of an emergency vehicle should be 
judged by the standard of care exercised by other operators 
of emergency vehicles and not by the usual standards required 
of other ordinary drivers on the highway. In accord with this 
position is the case of City of Baltimore vs. Fire Insurance 
Salvage Corporation of Baltimore, Supreme Court of Maryland, 
1959, 219 Maryland 75, 148 Atl. 2d 444, wherein that Court 
stated at page 448: 
"In holding that operators of authorized emergency 
vehicles are liable for ordinary negligence under the 
statute mentioned, we do not, of course, mean to state 
that their conduct in the operation of such vehicles is 
measured by exactly the same yardstick as the actions 
of the operators of conventional vehicles ... However, 
they are bound to exercise reasonable precautions 
against the extra-ordinary dangers of the situation 
that the proper performance of their duties compels 
them to create." 
The trial court, by giving its Instruction No. 16, in effect 
held the appellant to the same degree of care as other motorists 
using the highway and did not take into consideration the fact 
that the officer's conduct in operating an emergency vehicle 
in the performance of his duties should be measured in this 
13 
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light. Such an instruction was misleading to the jury in that 
no standard o£ care for emergency vehicle operators was pre-
sented to them so as to attain an intelligent determination 
of the issue. 
CONCLUSION 
In the case of Jensen vs. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 Pac. 
2d 838, this Court considered the applicability of Utah statutes 
relating to emergency vehicles under the 1949 amendment to 
the Motor Vehicle Act in question wherein emergency vehicles 
were required to slow down as may be necessary for safe oper-
ation before proceeding through red lights. Since the Jensen 
opinion was rendered, the Utah legislature saw fit to amend 
the Motor Vehicle Code, insofar as it relates to emergency 
vehicles, by removing the requirement of slowing down before 
proceeding through red lights or stop signs. (Italics ours). 
Title 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The 
jury specifically fol,l!ld that the appellant had the emergency 
vehicle under control. There was no evidence in our instant 
case to show that had the officer been driving at a slower rate 
of speed the accident could have been avoided. At a time when 
the officer knew or had reason to know of respondent's in-
attentiveness, there was not appreciable time for him to have 
averted the collision with less than 25 feet remaining in which 
to stop. The facts in the instant case are not in any way similar 
to those in Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 Pac. 2d 
884, where this Court, in reviewing the evidence in that case, 
found evidence that would support a finding of negligence 
against the police officer. In the Johnson case, the evidence 
14 
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indicated that the accident occurred on a rainy day during the 
noon rush hour and that the parties to the accident could have 
seen each other while 200 feet apart. Unlike the instant case 
there was, or should have been, knowledge on the part of the 
officer while 200 feet from the scene·. of the accident, of the 
inattentiveness of the other driver and with such knowledge, 
he proceeded into the intersection where the accident occurred. 
Speed, right of way, and such other ordinary rules . of the 
road have no application because the emergency driver is 
specifically exempted by statute from complying with those 
rules, and is only placed under a duty to ·drive with due regard 
for others under the circumstances. 
The respondent was at least contributorily negligent in 
failing to yield the right of way to appellant. All traffic in the 
vicinity had stopped to yield the right of way to the emergency 
vehicle. The respondent claimed that he did not ever hear a 
siren although the window was down on the driver's side of the 
automobile (Tr. 69) and the siren was constantly sounding 
right up to the moment of impact. Respondent must have 
heard the siren and chose to ignore it. If, in fact, he did not 
hear the siren, at a time when all other drivers in the immediate 
vicinity were yielding the right of way, then he nevertheless 
must be charged with hearing that which in the exercise of 
ordinary care would have been heard, and his failure to do so 
was negligence. 
The Court's instructions to the jury placed the same burden 
of care upon both operators. The appellant's actions were 
measured by those of an ordinary vehicle operator upon the 
highway and not by a standard of care that a reasonably prudent 
15 
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man would exercise in driving an emergency vehicle under lik~ 
circumstances. 
Appellant respectfully submits that there was no sub-
stantial evidence to support the jury's _finding that he was negli-
gent and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of 
the accident. The evidence further shows that the respondent 
was at least contributorily negligent as a matter of law and that 
the Court erroneously instructed the jury. There is absolutely 
no dispute in the evidence as to what occurred and under this 
set of facts and circumstances, justice dictates that the verdict 
and judgment should be reversed and set aside, and judgment 
entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, no 
cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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